Constitutional Transformations at the Edge of a Bail-Out: The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Legal and Institutional Structures in Slovenia by Bardutzky, Samo
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS LAW WORKING PAPERS   
School of Law, SOAS 
University of London 
Russell Square, GB-London 
WC1H 0XG, 
www.soas.ac.uk/law 
Constitutional Transformations at the Edge 
of a Bail-Out: The Impact of the Economic 
Crisis on the Legal and Institutional 
Structures in Slovenia 
Dr Samo Bardutzky, sb184@soas.ac.uk 
Teaching Fellow 
 
  
The author expresses his gratitude to Matija Damjan, Meta Ahtik and Maria 
Gomes. All errors are solely attributable to the author. 
 
Paper presented at the Istituzioni democratiche, crisi economica e decisioni 
di bilancio conference, University of Pisa, 3-4 December 2015 
No 4   2016      
This paper can be downloaded from: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23122/      
Rights: Published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License 
  
 
No. 4      2016 
1 
 
 
Contents 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Slovenia and the economic crisis 
1.2. Legal, constitutional and institutional background 
2. European responses to the crisis and the link to the weakening of the position of the 
zakon: the EFSF Case 
3. Referendum in the time of crisis 
3.1. Early phase of the crisis: the structural reforms 
3.2. Referendum and the measures at the peak of the crisis 
3.3. Constitutional reform of the legislative referendum 
3.4. Post-constitutional reform case law 
3.5. Direct democracy, indirect democracy and constitutional review - day-to-day and 
in the crisis 
3.6. Excursus 
4. The introduction of the fiscal rule in the Constitution 
5. Crisis soft law in the national legal system 
5.1. Council recommendations in the EMU Governance 
5.1.1. Recommendations in the excessive deficit procedure 
5.1.2. Recommendations for the prevention of macroeconomic imbalances (MIB) 
5.2. The role of Council recommendations in the national legal and constitutional 
system 
5.3. ‘Implementing’ Soft Law in National Legislation – the Commission’s Banking 
Communication and the Kotnik Case 
5.3.1. The Banking Communication in the Slovenian legal system 
5.3.2. The constitutional challenge to the Banking Act 
5.3.3. The reference for a preliminary ruling from the Slovenian Constitutional Court 
5.3.4. Kotnik: The sketch of a preliminary analysis 
  
 
No. 4      2016 
2 
6. Conclusion 
 
1. Introduction 
The introductory lines of this chapter follow two objectives. First, to briefly present the story 
of the economic crisis in Slovenia, with summary mention of some of the relevant political 
developments. This brief illustration is limited to basic information considered pertinent for the 
understanding of the context in which the legal and constitutional developments, described in 
Sections 2 - 5 of the chapter, took place.  
Second, before the chapter devotes itself to the question of how the constitutional structures 
were transformed in the crisis, it briefly presents the object of these transformations, i.e. the 
structural features of the Slovenian constitutional system. The introduction, however, does not 
attempt to present a full account of the system; again, it limits itself to what will be relevant for 
the observation of the transformations druing the crisis.   
1.1. Slovenia and the economic crisis 
Just as in Pharaoh‟s dream, first came the fat cows; they were followed by the lean, ugly cows 
that ate the lean cows. Slovenian accession to the European Union in 2004 was followed 
within months by joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM2). In the period of growth 
between 2004 and 2008, Slovenian banks borrowed extensively abroad, relying on cheap 
credit. The money was lent on to companies: corporate debt rose above EU average.
1
 But the 
cheap lending also led to economic growth. In 2007, the year when Slovenia as first of the 
Member States of the 2004 enlargement adopted the Euro, the country‟s GDP grew by 7%.2  
However, as a relatively strongly export oriented economy, Slovenia was in 2008 – 2009 hit 
hard with the beginning of the global economic crisis as the country‟s exports diminished. 
Cheap credit from abroad was no longer readily available which contributed to the 
                                                          
1 B. JAZBEC, Financial crises and the current situation in Slovenia, Address by Mr Boštjan Jazbec, Governor of Bank of 
Slovenia, at the Annual Conference of the Bank Association of Slovenia, Ljubljana, http://www.bis.org/review/r150205e.htm, 
18-11-2014.S. FURLAN, The Slovenian banking and debt crisis, http://www.troikawatch.net/the-slovenian-banking-and-debt-
crisis/, 8-4-2014.  
2 The economic indicators are available from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 
(http://www.stat.si/StatWeb/en/home).  
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bankruptcies and increased unemployment. Of course, when companies running on debt went 
out of business, the toxic loans polluted the balance sheets of the Slovenian banks.
3
 Lower tax 
revenues, higher social transfers and government assistance to (to a large extent state owned) 
commercial banks resulted in growing sovereign debt, with Slovenia landing in the excessive 
deficit procedure already in 2009.
4
   
The left-centre government of Borut Pahor, in power since 2008, put forward proposals of 
„structural‟ reforms, such as raising the pension age, adopting measures aimed at untaxed 
labour and introducing a supplementary, more flexible form of labour (malo delo). As will be 
discussed below in Section 3.1, these reforms were adopted by the National Assembly but 
rejected in a legislative referendum. Widely interpreted as a vote of discontent with the 
Government,
5
 the referendum failure soon led to tensions within the government coalition and 
a failure of the Pahor Cabinet to obtain a vote of confidence in September 2011. The snap 
election without a clear winner brought the centre-right Janša government into power in Spring 
2012. Austerity measures were immediately announced.
6
 On 30 May 2012, the Fiscal Balance 
Act was adopted, amending in one swing parts of 39 different statutes, many of them systemic 
legislation (e.g. the Health Act).
7
 Autumn 2012 saw the reform of state assets management and 
the adoption of the legal basis for the creation of a bad bank – the unsuccessful attempt to 
decide on these measures by popular vote will be discussed below in Section 3.2. 
The worsening economic and social situation in the country seemed to have required an 
additional trigger before the discontent of the population was expressed in the form of 
demonstrations and protests. The 2012 report of the Anti-Corruption Commission showed that 
both the prime minister as well as the leader of the largest opposition party were unable to 
                                                          
3 B. JAZBEC, Financial crises and the current situation in Slovenia, Address by Mr Boštjan Jazbec, Governor of Bank of 
Slovenia, at the Annual Conference of the Bank Association of Slovenia, Ljubljana, http://www.bis.org/review/r150205e.htm, 
18-11-2014.S. FURLAN, The Slovenian banking and debt crisis, http://www.troikawatch.net/the-slovenian-banking-and-debt-
crisis/, 8-4-2014. 
4 See below Section 5.1.1. 
5 Slovenian Press Agency (STA), Pahor: Glas proti malem delu tudi glas proti vladi,  https://www.sta.si/1625609/pahor-glas-
proti-malem-delu-tudi-glas-proti-vladi, 10-4-2011. 
6 Janša napovedal varčevanje in odpuščanja, in Delo, 9-2-2012, http://www.delo.si/novice/politika/jansa-napovedal-
varcevanje-in-odpuscanja.html. 
7 Zakon za uravnoteţenje javnih financ (ZUJF), UL 40/12. The Act was subsequently amended a number of times, last in 
December 2015. 
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fully account for their financial assets, leading to wide spread disillusion with the national 
politics in the electorate.
8
 Coalition partners left Janša‟s government and formed a left-centre 
coalition. Between March 2013 and September 2014, the Government was led by the 
previously little known former senior Ministry of Finance official, Alenka Bratušek.  
2011 and 2012 saw the expected yield on Slovenian state bonds reach the 7% threshold on 
three occasions. The financing of the sovereign debt on financial markets was becoming 
difficult.
9
 The Bratušek cabinet took over amidst widespread guessing in international media if 
Slovenia will be the next eurozone country to ask for financial assistance.
10
 However, this 
never happened. Bratušek‟s Cabinet continued with the project of financial consolidation while 
exports grew again. 2014 was the first year of economic growth after a period of five years. 
Bank of Slovenia in October 2015 predicted that the economy will continue to grow in the 
coming years.
11
  
 
1.2. Legal, constitutional and institutional background 
Two (formal) features of the Slovenian constitutional order need to be noted before embarking 
on a discussion on the responses to the crisis and their impact on the legal system.  
First, a central role, of undeniable constitutional importance, of the parliamentary statute (Slov. 
zakon), a legal act of general and abstract application, adopted by the National Assembly 
                                                          
8 K. VIDNER FERKOV, KPK: Janša in Janković sta edina hudo kršila zakonodajo, in Delo, 8-1-2013, 
http://www.delo.si/novice/politika/kpk-jansa-in-jankovic-sta-edina-hudo-krsila-zakonodajo.html. 
9 This was despite the fact that general government gross debt of Slovenia 2011-2013 was below the Eurozone as well as the 
EU-28 average. (The data is available from Eurostat at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/tipsgo10). This 
indicates the extent to which the risk that Slovenia might need a bail-out was connected to the overall climate of financial 
doom and gloom in 2011 and 2012 (Two Greek bail-outs in 2011, Spanish bail-out in 2012, concerns over Italy and 
Belgium…). I am grateful to Meta Ahtik for pointing this out.   
10 The next domino? Markets fret that little Slovenia could be next, in The Economist, 13-4-2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21576147-markets-fret-little-slovenia-could-be-next-next-domino. In October 2012, 
Slovenia, as its last attempt to secure credit on financial markets, issued US dollar denominated bonds. The then Finance 
Minister, Janez Šušteršič, later explained that as during his visit to the US, promoting the newly issued debt, the troika team 
was already prepared in case the bonds were not sold. Šušteršič: Trojka za Slovenijo je bila v Bruslju že pripravljena, in 
Dnevnik, 2-1-2013, https://www.dnevnik.si/1042570072. 
11 T. MODIC, Banka Slovenije: Krize je konec, pred nami svetla leta, in Dnevnik, 15-10-2015, 
https://www.dnevnik.si/1042722459. 
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(Državni zbor).12 On the one hand, the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter: 
Constitution),
13
 the highest legal act in the Slovenian legal stystem, expressly demands that a 
number of matters is regulated exclusively in the form of a zakon. On the other hand, the 
Constitution also attributes significance to zakon as a legal act through institutional and 
procedural provisions. 
Most importantly, the manner in which human rights and fundamental freedoms are exercised 
can only be set out in a zakon (Art. 15(2) Constitution). Whenever the Constitution allows for 
limitations on a particular human right or fundamental freedom in the text of the provision 
entrenching that human right, it prescribes that the limitation is to be enacted in the form of a 
zakon (Art. 15(3) Constitution). As per Art. 87 Constitution, any right or duty can only be 
conferred on 'citizens and other persons' in the form of a zakon. These provisions are essential 
in retaining the majority of legislative activity in the parliament. In addition to that, the 
Constitution requires that any criminal offence is defined as such by a zakon (Art. 28). The 
state can only 'impose taxes, customs duties, and other charges' in the form of a zakon (Art. 
147). As is relevant for the discussion here, the Constitution also demands that State 
borrowings and guarantees by the state for loans are only permitted on the basis of a zakon 
(Art. 149). 
But there is a reason for the insistence of the Constitution on the dominating position of the 
zakon in the Slovenian landscape of legal acts. The Constitution also envisages a legislative 
referendum where a zakon adopted by the National Assembly can be struck down by voters 
(this will be addressed in more detail in Section 3). Slovenia‟s unusual second chamber of the 
parliament, the National Council (Državni svet), can issue a suspensive veto against an adopted 
zakon - indeed this is one of the Council‟s few powers. Zakon is the only legal act promulgated 
by the President of the Republic (Art. 91/I Constitution). The strong presence of the zakon is 
thus tied to institutional checks to which it is submitted before entering into force.  
                                                          
12 While the most appropriate translation of zakon in English in abstract is “statute”. The English translation on the website of 
the Constitutional Court (http://www.us-rs.si/en/about-the-court/legal-basis/) uses the English word “law” which I believe is 
not precise enough, at least not for the purposes of the discussion here. However, the English equivalent when translating the 
name of a concrete piece of legislation is customarily „Act‟, e.g. Zakon o ustavnem sodišču - the Constitutional Court Act.  
13 Ustava Republike Slovenije, UL 33/91-I, 42/97 – UZS68, 66/00 – UZ80, 24/03 – UZ3a, 47, 68, 69/04 – UZ14, 69/04 – 
UZ43, 69/04 – UZ50, 68/06 – UZ121,140,143, 47/13 – UZ148 in 47/13 – UZ90,97,99.  
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Despite the checks on the lawmaking of the National Assembly, the entrenchment of the its 
jurisdiction in Art. 87 and the other constitutional clauses norms that demand that decisions are 
made in the form of a zakon, contributes to a strong position of the National Assembly (and of 
the legislative branch) especially in relation to the executive branch of government. (The term 
that has been used is „norm-making domination‟ of the National Assembly.14)  
Second, in recognizing that the supreme political power pertains to the people, the Constitution 
also recognized in the same sentence both indirect as well as direct democracy.  In this way, 
the text of the Constitution already sets the stage for what has evolved into a tension par 
excellence in the Slovenian constitutional system: (Art. 3(2)) 
In Slovenia power is vested in the people. Citizens exercise this power directly and 
through elections, consistent with the principle of the separation of legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers. 
The manifestation of the important role of direct democracy is, as mentioned, the legislative 
referendum (Art. 90(1)): 
The National Assembly shall call a referendum on the entry into force of a law that it 
has adopted if so required by at least forty thousand voters. 
The referendum is thus envisaged not as a tool in the hand of the electorate to adopt new 
solutions on its own, by-passing the parliament altogether, but rather as a salutary veto. It is 
important to note that the people, when deciding on the fate of a statute in a referendum, are 
considered to be exercising the legislative function of government. As a result, the people are 
bound by the Constitution just as the National Assembly is when it legislates.
15
 Consequently, 
the result of a legislative referendum must not violate the Constitution. Which, of course, 
raises the question: when can striking down a statute previously adopted by the parliament 
amount to a violation of the Constitution? And regardless of the 2013 amendment to the 
                                                          
14 P. PAVLIN, 87. člen, in L. ŠTURM, Komentar Ustave Republike Slovenije: Dopolnitev-A, Ljubljana, FDŠ, 2011, p. 1155. 
15 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Order U-II-1/15, UL 80/2015, para. 31. 
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Constitution that introduced (previously non-existent) expressis verbis limitations to the 
referendum, one of the prime constitutional issues has been and remains this exact question. 
 
European responses to the crisis and the link to the weakening of the position 
of the zakon: the EFSF Case 
Against the background of the strong entrenchment of the legislative powers of the National 
Assembly, the decision of the Constitutional Court on the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism can be read as a step back in the dominance of the zakon in the Slovenian legal and 
constitutional system. As was mentioned before, the Constitution, in Art. 149, demands not 
only state lending but also state guarantees for loans to be given only on the basis of a zakon.
16
 
The Act Regulating the Guarantees of the Republic of Slovenia for Ensuring Financial 
Stability in the Euro Area (ZPZFSEu)
17
 was challenged before the Constitutional Court by a 
group of 37 members of the National Assembly. They invoked precisely Art. 149, claiming 
that the ZPZFSEu, determining only the total sum and duration of Slovenia‟s guarantees for 
the EFSF‟s funding instruments, violates this constitutional requirement. According to their 
reading of Art. 149, the Constitution demands a special statute for each state guarantee, which 
lays down all the elements of the guarantee. The view of the applicants was also that the failure 
to provide a special statute for each guarantee amounted to a violation of the principle of 
separation of powers. This was supported by the fact that under the ZPZFSEu, the role of the 
National Assembly is limited to being informed of any guarantees given.
18
 The ZPZFSEu 
provides that it is the Government that approves the use of the funds on the basis of the 
guarantee and it does so for each yearly financing programme. It is the minister of finance that 
signs the individual guarantee agreements (Art. 4(5) ZPZFSEu).  
                                                          
16 Art. 149: „State borrowings and state guarantees for loans are permitted only on the basis of a statute.‟ See S. BARDUTZKY, 
149. člen, in L. ŠTURM, Komentar Ustave Republike Slovenije – Dopolnitev-A, Ljubljana, FDŠ, 2011, p. 1338.  
17 Zakon o poroštvu Republike Slovenije za zagotavljanje finančne stabilnosti v euroobmočju, UL 59/10, 79/11.  
18 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Decision U-I-178/10, UL 12/2011, para. 1. 
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The text of Art. 149 is phrased in a broad enough manner to permit for the interpretation taken 
by the opposition members of the National Assembly or that of the Government and the 
parliamentary majority. The Constitutional Court sided with the latter. It rejected all of the 
claims of the applicants and established that the ZPZFSEu does not envisage a series of 
guarantees. ZPZFSEu, on the contrary, is the legal basis for one large scale guarantee, with 
withdrawals to be made gradually, over a longer period of time, and in proportion to what is 
required.
19
 
It is, in a way, understandable that the Constitutional Court did not want to jeopardize the 
participation of Slovenia in the developing structures of the eurozone by choosing a 
„restrictive‟ reading of Art. 149. After all, the Court, in the opening section of the grounds for 
its decision, expressly stated that it will exercise judicial review in light of the economic crisis 
and the need for eurozone states to co-operate closely to tackle it.
20
 Nevertheless, an interim 
conclusion can be that the participation of Slovenia in the mechanisms designed to respond to 
the economic crisis has led to a different, narrower role for the zakon in the country‟s legal 
system, sanctioned by the Constitutional Court, with the implications for the system of 
separation of powers that this brings along.  
 
2. Referendum in the time of crisis  
2.1. Early phase of the crisis: the structural reforms 
The Slovenian constitutional system is importantly characterized by the strong position of 
indirect democracy. While there are different types of referendums in the Slovenian system 
(some, such as the referendum on the constitutional revision, are envisaged by the Constitution 
but have never been used - Art. 170 Constitution), the central type of referendum is the 
legislative referendum (Art. 90 Constitution).  
                                                          
19 Ibidem, para. 29.  
20 Ibidem, para. 10. 
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Since the decision of the Constitutional Court in 2005 that annulled the legislative provisions 
envisaging an ante legem (preliminary) legislative referendum,
21
 the only possible way of 
holding a popular ballot on a legislative issue is a post legem referendum. This means that after 
the National Assembly has adopted a zakon, 40,000 voters have the right to demand a 
referendum where it will be decided whether the contested statute will enter into force or not 
(Art. 16.c Referendum and Popular Initiative Act; hereinafter ZRLI).
22
     
Legislative referendum has been relatively widely used since the first one was held in 1996 
(the Constitution was adopted in 1991 and the ZRLI in 1994). Between 1996 and now, the fate 
of 16 statutes was decided by popular vote. It is not surprising that the Government and 
National Assembly have attempted to prevent referendums which jeopardized their efforts to 
legislate. But until 2013, when verbis limitations on the legislative referendum were introduced 
in Art. 90 Constitution, it seemed that the constitutional right to referendum was almost 
absolute. The only exception was a statutory provision, Art. 21 ZRLI, which charged the 
Constitutional Court with the jurisdiction to assess whether a referendum would lead to 
unconstitutional consequences. Until 2013, all the challenges to the calls for referendum, filed 
by the National Assembly, were based on Art. 21 ZRLI.   
The Art. 21 case law of the Constitutional Court oscillated. In its decision U-II-1/09, for 
example, the Court prevented a referendum on the Attorneys Act. Finding that there was a 
possibility that the unconstitutional consequences might materialize sufficed.  In later 
decisions, it demanded a certainty that such consequences will ensue.
23
 It was, however, with 
the beginning of the economic crisis and the measures adopted on the national level in order to 
respond to the crisis that the question of the permissibility of the referendum and the relevant 
case law obtained heavy political weight.
24
    
                                                          
21 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Decision U-I-217/02, UL 24/2005. 
22 Zakon o referendum in ljudski iniciativi (ZRLI). The original text of the statute was published in UL 15/94, This is the only 
permitted question; the referendum cannot be held with regard to a part of the adopted statute, or deciding between different 
alternative solutions.  
23 I. KAUČIČ, 90. člen, in L. ŠTURM, Komentar Ustave Republike Slovenije – Dopolnitev-A, Ljubljana, FDŠ, 2011, p. 1175.  
24 Or in the words of Ribičič and Kaučič, the Constitutional Court and its decisions were “subject to severe, at times 
inappropriate, criticisms of the parliamentary opposition.” C. RIBIČIČ and I. KAUČIČ, Constitutional Limits of Legislative 
Referendum: The Case of Slovenia, in Lex Localis - Journal of Local Self-Government, 2014, p. 904.  
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In December 2010, the National Assembly adopted two pieces of legislation proposed by the 
left-centre Pahor government: the amendments to the Prevention of Undeclared Work and 
Employment Act and the new Pension and Disability Insurance Act (ZPIZ-1). A referendum 
on the two statutes was demanded and the National Assembly turned to the Constitutional 
Court, asking it to prevent the referendum on ZPIZ-1. The National Assembly relied on the 
fact that a couple of the clauses of the previous Pension Act – the ones that laid down different 
rules for the employed, self-employed and farmers - had already been found unconstitutional; 
the Constitutional Court had explicitly ordered the legislator to bring them in line with the 
Constitution.
25
 However, the Constitutional Court found that the new ZPIZ-1 envisaged a large 
scale reform (the Act contained 450 articles and significantly changed the conditions under 
which old age pension could be acquired). A referendum on a large scale reform cannot be 
prevented on account of minor incompatibilities with the Constitution, established 
beforehand.
26
  
The Constitutional Court also rejected the claim of the National Assembly that the failure of 
the Act to enter into force would lead to a violation of the constitutional right to old age 
pension (Art. 50 Constitution). The position of the National Assembly was that maintaining the 
unsustainable old age pension system might cause difficulties in providing the funding for the 
old age pensions in the future, thereby de facto making the exercise of the constitutional right 
to old age pension impossible. The Constitutional Court rejected the claim as the 
unconstitutional situation was not present at the time when the review took place. Merely a 
future possibility of unconstitutional consequences cannot be admitted as a valid argument.
27
  
The Constitutional Court was (without much explanation) also not swayed by the concerns of 
the National Assembly that, should the unsustainable old age pension system remain in place, 
Slovenia will in the future need to borrow more money to finance it. This may force the state 
to violate its obligations under the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (the Maastricht 
Criteria). Equally unpersuasive were the concerns of the National Assembly that the failure of 
                                                          
25 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Decision U-II-1/11, UL 20/2011, para. 3 and 21. 
26 Ibidem, paras. 21 - 25.  
27 Ibidem, paras. 31 - 32. 
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ZPIZ-1 to enter into force would mean that the old age pensions would require so much 
funding that eventually, other constitutionally protected social rights would need to be 
restricted.
28
  
2.2. Referendum and the measures at the peak of the crisis  
In Autumn 2012, upon the proposal of the right-centre Janša Government, the National 
Assembly adopted two pieces of legislation: the Act Defining the Measures of the Republic of 
Slovenia to Strengthen Bank Stability (ZUKSB) and the Slovenian Sovereign Holding Act 
(ZSHD). The former envisaged the establishment of a bad bank (the Bank Assets 
Managements Company). The latter foresaw the transfer of all state controlled companies to a 
sovereign holding.
29
 The parliamentary opposition demanded a referendum; one of the trade 
unions also started collecting the 40,000 signatures of voters required to call a referendum.
30
   
The National Assembly turned to the Constitutional Court with a request to find that the 
referendum would lead to unconstitutional consequences, invoking the above mentioned Art. 
21 ZRLI. It asserted that Slovenia will come to a position where it will have no choice but to 
request for international financial assistance if the measures in question are not adopted 
immediately. The obligations it will have to accept in a Memorandum of Understanding in 
such a case will infringe upon Slovenia‟s sovereignty which is a constitutional principle. The 
implementation of these obligations will be monitored by a „troika‟. 31  The second claim, 
related to the ZSHD, was that there was a host of obligations to the EU (and its Member 
States) that Slovenia would be in danger of violating if the Act did not enter into force: the 
transposition of one of the Six pack directives (2011/85/EU), the respect for Arts. 119 and 126, 
and the Fiscal Compact.
32
  
The position of the National Assembly was that the unconstitutionality of the system that was 
to be replaced by ZSDH was due to the fact that the operation of the AUKN was intransparent 
                                                          
28 Ibidem, para. 33 
29 Prior to that, the powers of the State as owner were previously exercised by an independent state agency (AUKN). 
30 Prior to the 2013 constitutional reform, which will be discussed below in 3.3., the Constitution still guaranteed a right for a 
third of the members of the National Assembly to demand a legislative referendum. 
31 Ibidem, para. 3.  
32 Ibidem, paras. 2 -3.  
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and riddled with anomalies. This reduced the credibility of the country abroad, leading to 
lower credit ratings and more expensive financing by debt. This would in turn make it more 
difficult for the State to guarantee the constitutionally guaranteed social rights.
33
   
Without excessive simplification we could posit that the claims of the National Assembly (fear 
of inability to service the sovereign debt, consequential difficulties in fulfilling constitutional 
and international obligations) in 2012 were not particularly different from the ones put forward 
in Winter 2010. The most significant change was the level of urgency with which they were 
presented. There was, however, an important difference. Contrary to the situation in the 
Pension Act case in 2010, the National Assembly in 2012, did not have a „black on white‟ 
decision of the Constitutional Court establishing that the laws currently in force were 
unconstitutional, which had until then been considered a straightforward first step in building a 
case against the referendum.  
In light of this, the Constitutional Court decided to revisit the starting points” of the way 
referendum cases were decided and “upgrade” its understanding of “unconstitutional 
consequences”.34 The tests that the Court had so far applied were useful in cases where an 
unconstitutional situation had already been established in a decision of the Constitutional Court 
and the legislature‟s failure to implement them would violate the principles of the state 
governed by the rule of law and the separation of powers. But the Court realized that there 
were also cases where there are other constitutionally important values that need to be 
protected. These constitutionally important values can also be balanced against the Art. 90 
right to demand a referendum.
35
 The Constitutional Court looked into the data provided by the 
Ministry of Finance which helped it reach the interim conclusion that there was an element of 
urgency/necessity (nujnost) as far as the ability of the other two branches to guarantee 
undisturbed functioning of the State was concerned.
36
   
                                                          
33 Ibidem, para. 8.  
34 Ibidem, para. 26.  
35 Ibidem, para. 27. 
36 Ibidem, para. 44.  
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The constitutionally relevant considerations that need to be taken into account are, especially 
in light of Art. 8 Constitution that commands respect for Slovenia‟s international obligations: 
- the Fiscal Compact obligations (para. 46); 
- the credibility of the State in light of the findings made within the excessive deficit 
procedure (Art. 126 TFEU), especially as the Council can within its Art. 126 powers 
call on the European Investment Bank to reconsider its policy towards a Member State, 
which could have adverse consequences for Slovenia (Regulation 1467/97 as amended 
in 2005 and 2011; para. 47 - 48); 
- Directive 2011/85/EU and the obligation of the State not to adopt measures contrary to 
the objectives of the directive before the transposition (para. 49).  
Once establishing that there are important considerations that can be balanced against the right 
to referendum, i.e. that action needs to be taken in order to offset unconstitutional 
consequences, the Constitutional Court takes the backseat with regard to the appropriateness of 
the measures. There are no rational reasons that would raise doubts as to the assessments of the 
National Assembly that the Acts are necessary for ensuring that the State maintains sustainable 
public finances. The Court does stress that it is not only the Government and the National 
Assembly that consider ZSDH and ZUKSB to be necessary measures but also “important 
international subjects”. Whether these measures are - in substance - the right response to the 
situation in the country is not something for the Constitutional Court to decide. It belongs 
within the domain of the legislature to choose the way in which it will respond to existing 
societal needs.
37
 In light of this, the Constitutional Court concluded that the referendum would 
lead to unconstitutional consequences.  
 
2.3. Constitutional reform of the legislative referendum 
In May 2013, the National Assembly adopted amendments to the Constitution related to the 
legislative referendum.
38
 Three key changes were introduced to Art. 90. First, the „institutional 
                                                          
37 Ibidem, paras. 54 - 56.  
38 Constitutional Act Amending Articles 90, 97 and 99 of the Constitution of Republic of Slovenia (UZ90, 97, 99), UL 47/13. 
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actors‟, i. e. the parliamentary minority and the National Council were stripped of their right to 
demand a legislative referendum. This is now exclusively the right of 40,000 voters.
39
 Second, 
a minimal absolute number of voters that must cast a vote against the entry into force of the 
statute in question was set. Third, the Constitution expressis verbis enumerates the types of 
statutes that are immune to a referendum challenge: 
● statutes on urgent measures to ensure the defence of the state, security, or the 
elimination of the consequences of natural disasters; 
● statutes on taxes, customs duties, and other compulsory charges, and on the law 
adopted for the implementation of the state budget; 
● statutes ratifying treaties;40 
● statutes eliminating an unconstitutionality in the field of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms or any other unconstitutionality. 
It would be easy to proclaim that there is a connection between the constitutional revision to 
the issues encountered in the crisis and the subsequent decision of the political elite to establish 
a straightforward legal limit to indirect democracy in the law. However, while the 2010 and 
2012 cases discussed above might have contributed to the determination among the members 
of the National Assembly to adopt a reform of this kind, the idea was by far not novel. The 
ZRLI in its 1994 version (on the level of a statute!) included a list of limitations (Art. 10) very 
similar to the one adopted in the 2013 constitutional reform. The provision was annulled by the 
Constitutional Court in 1995 as there was no constitutional basis for such a limitation of the 
right to referendum.
41
 In a sense, the 2013 constitutional reform was the final act of a process 
that had started twenty years ago.  
2.4. Post-constitutional reform case law 
In light of a new, seemingly clear constitutional basis for the restriction of referendums that 
would prevent a statute remedying an unconstitutional situation from entering into force, it is 
                                                          
39 The prerogative of the National Assembly to call a referendum upon its own initiative was also abolished. 
40 See more on this in S. BARDUTZKY, The future mandate of the Constitution of Slovenia: A potent tradition under strain, in 
A. ALBI (ed.) The Role and Future of Constitutions in European and Global Governance, TMC Asser Press, the Hague, 
forthcoming in 2016. 
41 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Decision U-I-47/94, UL 13/1995. See also I. KAUČIČ, F. GRAD, S. ZAGORC, S. NERAD, S. 
BARDUTZKY, Zakonodajni referendum, Ljubljana, GV Zaloţba and Inštitut za primerjalno pravo, 2010, p. 109.  
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interesting to observe the first referendum case after the 2013 reform despite the fact that it is 
not directly linked to the economic crisis. An attempt of the National Assembly to introduce 
marriage equality by redefining marriage as a “regulated life community of two persons” (and 
mutatis mutandis with regard to legally recognized extramarital unions) was challenged by 
voters demanding a referendum.
42
 The Constitutional Court had in the past established that 
certain legislative solutions were discriminatory. The National Assembly, in the legislative 
process, had identified several more. The new definition of the marriage and extramarital union 
would solve all of them.
43
 In light of that and of the new constitutional clause, the prevalent 
expectation was that the Court would not allow the referendum. And yet it did. The Court‟s 
position was that in order for an unconstitutional situation that is allegedly being remedied in 
the contested statute to come in the way of the exercise of the constitutional right to 
referendum, the unconstitutional situation must have been established by the Constitutional 
Court. And not in another way, e. g. by the National Assembly itself.  
This is of course in stark contrast to the Bad Bank and Sovereign Holding Referendum case. In 
the balancing exercise with the Art. 90 right to referendum, a certain categorization or even 
hierarchy of constitutional rights, principles and values seems to have been introduced. This 
categorization can perhaps be connected to a certain day-to-day v. crisis dichotomy. In a day-
to-day setting, the National Assembly can only contest the exercise of the right to referendum 
if it holds on to a black-on-white finding of the Constitutional Court that an unconstitutional 
situation exists. If it – presumably only in a situation of urgency, however - invokes the 
nondescript “other constitutional values”, such as the international obligations and credibility 
of the State, the National Assembly‟s own establishing of an unconstitutionality will be 
sufficient. Without the sufficiently underlined element of urgency, as can be observed in the 
Pension Act Referendum case, even the prior finding of unconstitutionality by the 
Constitutional Court does not suffice. 
                                                          
42 The statute in question is the Act Amending the Marriage and Family Relations act (ZZZDR-D), that was rejected on the 
referendum held on 20 December 2015.  
43 To avoid confusion, there was a previous 2011 (pre-constitutional revision) case when a similar attempt has been made to 
redefine marriage and extramarital union in the new Family Code and similarly, a referendum was demanded (Constitutional 
Court of Slovenia, Decision U-II-3/11, UL 109/2011). The Constitutional Court gave a green light to the referendum and the 
Family Code was rejected by popular vote. 
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2.5. Direct democracy, indirect democracy and constitutional review - day-to-day and 
during the crisis  
From a more abstract perspective of the relationship between the direct democracy, indirect 
(representative) legislature and constitutional judicial review, the referendum cases are - 
generally speaking in the Slovenian context - an question of how much deference is to be 
accorded to the people as the substitute legislator.
44
 Both the Constitutional Court as well as 
the National Assembly, undertake the function of bringing democratically adopted statutes in 
line with the requirements of the Constitution. In part, the National Assembly in this scenario 
acts as an “agent” of the Constitutional Court whenever and insofar it acts upon a prior 
decision of the Constitutional Court by adopting a statute that will remedy the previously 
established unconstitutionality. Insofar as the National Assembly transcends the Constitutional 
Court‟s case law (e. g. by adopting a wide-ranging reform that supplants the prior legislation, 
as was the case with the Pension Act), it nevertheless acts - or purports to act - as the guardian 
of the Constitution although it is of course possible that its interpretation of the Constitution 
differs from the interpretation of the Court. In that sense, the crisis referendum case law of the 
Slovenian Constitutional Court would strike us as a limitation on democratic decision making 
in the name of upholding the Constitution. This would be seemingly in contrast with the view 
that the deference which the Courts have shown the other branches of the government (cf. the 
ESM or the Fiscal Compact cases in the different European jurisdiction). However, even if we 
are to perceive the crisis referendum case law of the Slovenian Constitutional Court as tilting 
the balance from democratic decision making to guarding the Constitution, at the same time 
we need to recognize that the price tag for this is the expansion of what is understood as 
„constitutional‟. The crisis perception of the constitutional reaches not only into the territory 
that has little or no textual root in the Constitution, but reaches even soft law and extralegal 
considerations.  
                                                          
44 In the sense of the position of the Constitutional Court on the „boundedness‟ of the people by the Constitution, mentioned 
above in text to footnote no. 15, and in light of the discussion above in Section 3.1. 
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2.6. Excursus 
The above posited considerations on the contrast between the day-to-day and crisis referendum 
law were soon put to test. This is mentioned as a sidenote here as the case is not itself 
connected to the financial or debt crisis; it is instead linked to the recent developments in the 
refugee crisis. While of course some of the Member States of the European Union (e. g. 
Greece, Italy and Malta) have been dealing with high numbers of incoming refugees from the 
Middle East and elsewhere for several years now, Slovenia is one of the countries that only 
seriously faced the arrival of a large number of refugees in Autumn 2015 after Hungary closed 
its border with Serbia and Croatia. The arrival of several thousands people every day turned 
out to be an enormous logistical challenge for the limited resources of one of the smallest 
Member States, charged with protecting the external border of the Schengen area.
45
 
Claiming that it was necessary for the police forces to be joined by the military in the policing 
of the border and controlling refugees, the National Assembly passed amendments to the 
Defence Act. The new Art. 37.a provides that the National Assembly can temporarily vest 
police powers, as far as the control of the state border is concerned, in the members of the 
Slovenian Army. Soldiers would thus be able to issue warnings and instructions, limit 
movement, etc. The journalists of the Ljubljana student radio (Radio Študent) started collecting 
voters‟ signatures in order to demand a referendum with the hope of preventing the 
amendments from entering into force.
46
 The National Assembly invoked the new referendum 
clause (Art. 90), claiming that the amendments to the Defence Act were an “urgent measure to 
ensure the defence of the state, security, or the elimination of the consequences of natural 
disasters” and rejected the referendum. Radio Študent turned to the Constitutional Court, 
asking it to annul this decision and allow for a referendum.
47
   
                                                          
45 Refugees cross into Slovenia after Hungary closes border with Croatia, in The Guardian, 17-10-2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/17/refugees-slovenia-hungary-closes-border-croatia 
46 P. JANČIČ, Radio Študent ustavil vojake, in Delo 28-10-2015, http://www.delo.si/novice/politika/radio-student-zbral-in-
oddal-3000-podpisov-za-referendum.html. The discontent with the meddling of the Yugoslav People‟s Army in civilian affairs 
at the end of the 1980s was at the centre of processes leading to democratisation and independence of the country. In that 
sense, it could even be asserted that the strong division between the military and civilian sphere (cf. Arts. 42/IV, 123, 126/II 
Constitution) is not one of the central elements of Slovenian constitutional identity.  
47 Constitutional Court, Order U-II-2/15, UL 98/2015. 
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The National Assembly defended the measure and the claim that it was an urgent one by 
stating that the numbers of persons entering the national territory from Croatia was 
exceptionally high and was bringing the police force to the edge of its capacities. On 21 
October 2015, as many as 12,616 persons entered the Slovenian territory, with only 1,139 
police officers on the border. In view of the National Assembly, this justifies the involvement 
of the military. In addition to that, the National Assembly found that the urgent character of 
this measure was also evident from the fact that the powers that were vested the military were 
characterized as exceptional, that the measure was temporally limited, and additionally, that 
the amendments envisaged that these exceptional powers would only be activated provided 
that two thirds of the members of the National Assembly voted in favour.
48
 
The Constitutional Court first reviewed whether the statute in question fell within the scope of 
the Art. 90 limitations, and established that the amendments to the Defence Act indeed had to 
be considered a “statute containing measures to ensure security”. In the next step, the Court 
asked whether the measures were urgent and briefly concluded that there was “nothing that 
would cause it to doubt the rationality of the assessment put forward by the National 
Assembly, from which it follows that the use of the contested measures could very briefly 
prove to be urgent in order to ensure security.”49 As a result, the Court upheld the order of the 
National Assembly with which the referendum was rejected.
50
 
While the legal parameters of this case differ considerably from the referendum case law 
hitherto, there are still analogies from the broader constitutional perspective between the 
economic policy (broadly speaking) referendum case law and the Defence Act referendum 
decision. The triangle people-parliament-court was again established with the Constitutional 
Court acting as umpire between the people (as the substitute legislator) on the one hand and the 
National Assembly (as the proxy guardian of values - in this case security - purportedly 
superior to democratic law-making) on the other hand. It seems that the outcome of the 
Defence Act Referendum case confirmed that this recent, second “crisis” once again tilted the 
                                                          
48 Ibidem, para. 12. 
49 Ibidem, para. 17 and 18.  
50 This means that the amendments were able to enter into force; Zakon o dopolnitvi Zakona o obrambi (ZObr-E), UL 95/15. 
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balance and provided for a reading of the Constitution that is highly deferential to the 
parliament. A thesis could be put forward that the notion of “urgency” serves as highly 
valuable currency for the National Assembly (or the Government) to invoke whenever possible 
to secure a high level of deference from the Constitutional Court. A notion of “crisis 
constitutionalism” can be said to have taken root beyond the decisions connected to the 
Eurozone crisis. The considerations of the nation‟s credibility in the international community 
and among its European partners that were so prominently articulated in the Bad Bank and 
Sovereign Holding referendum case were here not mentioned at all. Nor did the National 
Assembly rely on Slovenia‟s obligations under or related to the Schengen Agreement. But it is 
nevertheless obvious that the political pressure from other Schengen countries was and remains 
present. The decision of the Constitutional Court was adopted on 3 December 2015, a mere 
week after Jeroen Dijsselbloem, head of Eurogroup, warned that “major European powers 
could be forced to retreat into a “mini-Schengen” zone if peripheral member states do not help 
shoulder the burdens of the migrant crisis”.51 Of course, in absence of any indication in the 
Constitutional Court decision, it can only be speculated whether this pressure also reached the 
judges‟ chambers.  
 
3. The introduction of the fiscal rule in the Constitution 
 
In 2013, upon the proposal of the Government, the National Assembly amended Art. 148 of 
the Constitution.
52
 The principal change was the insertion of the new paragraphs 2 and 3: 
(2) Revenues and expenditures of the budgets of the state must be balanced in the 
medium-term without borrowing, or revenues must exceed expenditures. Temporary 
deviation from this principle is only allowed when exceptional circumstances affect the 
state. 
                                                          
51 P. Foster, Refugee crisis could trigger 'mini-Schengen' warns Eurogroup chief, in The Telegraph, 27-11-2015, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/12021328/PICANDPUB-Refugee-crisis-could-trigger-mini-Schengen-
warns-Eurogroup-chief.html.  
52 Constitutional Act amending Article 148 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (UZ148), UL 47/13.  
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(3) The manner and the time frame of the implementation of the principle referred to in 
the preceding paragraph, the criteria for determining exceptional circumstances, and the 
course of action when they arise, shall be determined by a law adopted by the National 
Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of all deputies. 
The Government in its proposal stressed, first, the necessity of a balanced budget for stable 
public finances and the benefits of a constitutional fiscal rule. It then also stated as reason for 
the constitutional revision the sovereign debt crisis in the European Union and the norms at the 
EU or intergovernmental level that require Slovenia to adopt this change (Six-pack in 
connection with the Stability and Growth Pact; the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the EMU).
53
  
It is obvious from the text inserted in Art. 148 Constitution that the constitution-maker did not 
intend for the Constitution to provide a comprehensive fiscal rule with all its procedural and 
institutional implications. Paragraph 3 delegates the resolution of all of these questions to the 
ordinary legislator, albeit a two-thirds majority of all the members of the National Assembly 
are required for the adoption of the zakon laying down the nuts and bolts of the fiscal rule.
54
 
The Constitutional Act envisaged that the National Assembly will adopt the statute foreseen in 
para. 3 within 6 months from the entry into force of the Constitutional Act (and that the 2015 
State Budget will already be prepared in line with the amended Art. 148).
55
 It is worth noting 
that the Government “attached” to its Proposal a “working draft” of the fiscal rule statute (not 
an official proposal for a statute to be adopted), thus laying its cards on the table as to the more 
detailed contents of the statute.
56
 
Given that the majority required for the adoption of the statute detailing the fiscal rule (a 
qualified, two thirds absolute majority) is the same as the majority required to amend the 
                                                          
53 Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Proposal for Initiation of the Procedure to Amend Article 148 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Slovenia, EVA 2012-1611-0041, available from http://imss.dz-rs.si/imis/a4b04ca1ec04161bee28.pdf.  
54 See also M. AHTIK, M. BRKAN and Ţ. NENDL, Slovenia, in U. NEERGAARD,  C. JACQUESON and J. H. DANIELSEN (eds.) The 
Economic and Monetary Union: Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Economic Governance within the EU, Vol. 1. 
DJØF Publishing, Copenhagen, p. 532, 
55 UZ148, Sect. II. The Proposal of the Government foresaw a one year period for the adoption of the fiscal rule statute.  
56 Pages 10 et seq. of the PDF document containing the Proposal, available at http://imss.dz-
rs.si/imis/a4b04ca1ec04161bee28.pdf. 
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Constitution (cf. Art. 169 Constitution), the decision to divide the matter between the two 
forms  Constitution and zakon  has to be rooted elsewhere, not in the elevated difficulty 
connected with constitutional rules. The Government itself in its proposal stated that the reason 
was the fact that the problematic state of the public finances did not allow for immediate 
implementation of the fiscal rule.
57
  
This problem could, at least in theory, still be resolved by adopting the detailed rules in the 
Constitution itself, in combination with postponing the time when they become effective. That 
is why alternative explanations of this course of action should be discussed.  
First, given that the statute was finally adopted in July 2015 (which is 20 months rather than 6 
months after the entry into force of the Constitutional Act), the possibility cannot be 
disregarded that the Government and National Assembly acted fast to demonstrate, on an 
expressive level, their dedication to a balanced budget, without however necessarily being 
prepared to act on it.  
Second, the report of the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly
58
 shows that 
there was a considerable disagreement in the Constitutional Commission and in the expert 
group.
59
 It is possible, then, that the sufficient level of agreement within the National 
Assembly required to adopt the amendment to the Constitution was only achievable for a 
limited, “skeletal” addition to the constitutional text. Even broader than this, the discussion in 
the legal periodicals at the time of the constitutional revision reveals that the insertion of the 
fiscal rule was contested outside the formal processes of constitutional revision as well. 
Slovenian constitutional scholars felt that there was no room for a strong expression of 
ideology or one particular economic doctrine in the constitution. Constitutionalisation 
                                                          
57 Ibidem, p. 7.  
58 In the process of constitutional revision in Slovenia, an important role is given to the Constitutional Commission, a working 
body of the National Assembly, which prepares the final version of the text of the constitutional act with which the 
Constitution is amended and puts it before the plenary session for a vote. In this way, the subject that proposed that the 
revision procedure starts (in practice this is most commonly the Government) is in a way removed from the final phases of the 
drafting of the text. While the Commission is composed of the members of the National Assembly, it summons an ad hoc 
expert group that submits an opinion on the proposed changes.  
59 National Assembly, Constitutional Commission, Report on the  drafting of the proposal of the constitutional act, no. 001-
02/12-8/, 14 May 2012, available at http://imss.dz-rs.si/imis/cba268208b363f9f517e.pdf. 
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represents a long-term commitment that would require considerable effort to be overturned in 
the future, when the economic reality or policy may change.
60
 Additionally, the reasonableness 
of pursuing the European project by imposing a top down constitutional reform on the Member 
States was questioned.
61
 It has also been pointed out that tension between debt limitations and 
the concept of the social state is inevitable, with calls made for the priority of the latter (as a 
fundamental value of the Constitution) over the former.
62
 
The third reason may sound banal, perhaps in comparison to the first two. However, it seems 
that the constitution drafting processes are also influenced by a factor that is perhaps best 
described as indefinable aesthetics of constitution-making. Prominent constitutionalists appear 
to have a certain sense of what belongs in the text of the constitution and what not. It is 
probably a result of practice or custom. This sense is not necessarily connected to their 
political or philosophical views; it is perhaps more that the Constitution as the highest legal act 
and a document of symbolic value cannot be overloaded with technical detail.
63
 This may as 
well have lead to the decision to divide the matter between the constitution and statute, limiting 
the former to a skeletal, abstract rule and leaving the detail to the statute.
64
  
 
4. Crisis soft law in the national legal system  
 
Undoubtedly, the crisis and the responses to it have altered the role of soft law in European 
Union law and the processes of integration. It can arguably be observed that the European 
Union, in responding to the crisis, resorted to an increased extent to soft law to achieve its 
objectives. This does not necessarily suggest that there is, in noticeable terms, now soft law 
                                                          
60 B. BUGARIČ, Reševanje evra in začetek konca EU?, in Pravna praksa, 2012, Issue 5, p. 3; I. VUKSANOVIĆ, Ustava in 
ekonomska politika, in Pravna praksa, 2011, Issue 41/42, p. 18-20. 
61 M. NAHTIGAL, Evropski fiskalni pakt - preveč tog in omejevalen, in Pravna praksa, 2012, Issue 12, p. II-VII.  
62 Ibidem; G. STRBAN, Ustavna zapoved socialne države ni pravno nezavezujoča norma, in Pravna praksa, 2012, issue 22, p.  
3.  
63 These conclusions are drawn from personal experience in constitution-drafting processes. 
64 I have written on this issue with regard to the 2004 „Euro-amendment‟ (Art. 3.a) of the Constitution in S. BARDUTZKY, The 
future mandate of the Constitution of Slovenia: A potent tradition under strain, in A. ALBI (ed.) The Role and Future of 
Constitutions in European and Global Governance, TMC Asser Press, the Hague, forthcoming in 2016, Section. 1.5. 
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where hard law used to be. It is more likely that with the transformations in EU law and in the 
EMU, many instruments of soft law have been “hardened”; elements of hard law have been 
employed to increase the efficiency of the soft law instruments.
65
   
A comparative discussion as is present in this volume is an opportunity to observe whether was 
through the changed circumstances that the European Union‟s use of soft law gained more 
influence on the social, economic and legal situation in the Member States. Not only that, a 
comparative discussion is valuable as it includes into the discussion the perspectives of the 
individual Member States. As far as this account is concerned, this means that the experience 
of Slovenia with soft law can be discussed in light of the theses formulated with regard to the 
EMU as a whole.  
It has in this context and from a perspective beyond individual Member State case studies - 
been observed how soft law has played a particular role in the EMU. It enabled the EU 
institutions to steer the economic policies of the Member States and gain an effect on national 
policy-making while at the same time preserving the Member States‟ autonomy, at least in the 
formal sense. Since, when using soft law, the competence boundaries were respected (no new 
competences are acquired by the Union institution), there was no need for a further transfer of 
powers. From this  let us say “formal”  angle, not much has changed in the crisis and 
competence boundaries have not been transformed.
66
 
 
But what is the impact of the “hardened” soft law, mentioned before, on the legal and 
institutional structures in a Member State? 
Two such occasions will be discussed in this section. First, we will take a closer look at what 
has already been mentioned above in relation to the Bad Bank and Sovereign Holding 
Referendum case: the excessive deficit procedure and the recommendations to the Member 
                                                          
65 A. HINAREJOS, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 75. 
66 Ibidem, p. 74. 
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State within this procedure. Alongside, we mention the Council recommendations within the 
macroeconomic imbalance procedure. 
Second, soft law  more precisely, a Commission Communication  has been the central issue 
of the first reference for a preliminary ruling made by the Slovenian Constitutional Court to the 
ECJ; the Kotnik case which is currently pending before the Court of Justice.   
 
4.1. Council recommendations in the EMU Governance 
4.1.1. Recommendations in the excessive deficit procedure 
After a procedure that took place in 2009, the Council in January 2010 officially declared that 
an excessive deficit existed in Slovenia.
67
 The country continues to be in the excessive deficit 
procedure (TFEU 126(7)). Recommendations with a view to bringing an end to the situation of 
an excessive government deficit were issued by the Council (acting upon recommendation of 
Commission) on 2 December 2009 and again on 21 June 2013.
68
  
In the excessive deficit procedure, the Council recommendations to Slovenia are relatively 
general from the perspective of their potential impact on the legal system of the country (the 
comparison here is with the level of detail in the macroeconomic imbalance procedure which 
will be addressed shortly). The 2009 Recommendation contains relatively general 
recommendations: to put an end to the excessive deficit situation, implement fiscal 
consolidation measures, etc. The only more concrete suggestion is to “further reform the 
pension system with a view to curbing age-related expenditures as soon as possible”.  
The 2013 Recommendation no longer mentions the pension system. However, in addition to 
the recommendations on putting an end to the excessive deficit situation, reaching a general 
                                                          
67 Council Decision 2010/289/EU, OJ L 125/46. 
68 Council Recommendation 15760/09; Council Recommendation 10563/13. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/slovenia_en.htm. A further recommendation 
was issued by the Commission in 2014, calling on Slovenia to ensure full compliance with the 2013 Council recommendation. 
(Commission Recommendation of 5.3.2014 regarding measures to be taken by Slovenia in order to ensure a timely correction 
of its excessive deficit, C(2014) 1501). 
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deficit target, etc., it also makes two relatively more concrete recommendations. Slovenia 
should: 
“rigorously implement the measures already adopted to increase mainly indirect tax 
revenue and reduce the public sector wage bill and social tranfers, while standing ready 
to complement them with additional measures if their yield would prove less than 
foreseen or if any measure is repealed by the justice system.”69 
4.1.2. Recommendations for the prevention of macroeconomic imbalances (MIB) 
On the basis of the six-pack Regulation 1176/2011, the EU institutions began monitoring the 
economies of the Member States with the view of preventing macroeconomic imbalances in 
2012.
70
 The first Alert Mechanism, in 2012, listed Slovenia as the one of the countries where 
an in-depth review would be carried out.
71
 Following the in-depth review, the Commission 
concluded that Slovenia was experiencing excessive macroeconomic imbalances.
72
  
Council Recommendations, based on Art. 6(1) of the Regulation 1176/2011 (preventive 
action) were issued in 2013, 2014 and 2015.
73
 In comparison to the Council recommendations 
issued in the excessive deficit procedure, the level of detail and concreteness in the MIB 
recommendations is considerably higher. In 2013, the Council recommended, inter alia, that 
Slovenia: 
                                                          
69 Point 3 of the recommendations (p. 13). Slovenia should additionally “support growth potential of the economy including 
through avoiding further cuts in public investment” (p. 14).  
70 Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ L 306. 
71 First Alert Mechanism Report on macroeconomic imbalances in Member States MEMO/12/104, 14 February 2012, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-104_en.pdf 
72 Council Recommendation of 9 July 2013 on the National Reform Programme 2013 for Slovenia and delivering a Council 
opinion on the stability programme of Slovenia 2012-2016, 2013/C 217/19, OJ C 217/75 (hereinafter: 2013 MIB Council 
Recommendation), Recital 8 of the Preamble. 
73 of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Slovenia and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Slovenia, 2014, 2014/C 247/22, OJ C 247/115 (2014 MIB Council Recommendation); Council 
Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Slovenia and delivering a Council opinion on 
the 2015 Stability Programme of Slovenia, 2015/C 272/02, OJ C 272/6 (hereinafter: 2015 MIB Council Recommendation).  
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 strengthens „the long-term sustainability of the pension system beyond 2020 by further 
adjusting all relevant parameters, including through linking the statutory retirement age 
to gains in life expectancy, while preserving the adequacy of pensions‟ (point 2); 
 ensures that „wage developments, including the minimum wage, support 
competitiveness and job creation‟ (point 3; emphasis added); 
 conducts a „reform of regulated services, including a significant reduction of entry 
barriers‟ (point 6); 
 reduces further the length of judicial proceedings at first instance in litigious civil and 
commercial cases and reduces the number of pending cases, especially enforcement 
cases (point 7); 
 streamlines insolvency and company restructuring procedures (point 8).74 
The 2014 MIB Council Recommendation repeated the demand for the reduction of the length 
of judicial proceedings (point 6). It increased the level of detail regarding the pension system, 
additionally calling on Slovenia to “encourage private contributions to the second pillar of the 
pension system” (point 2). It also refined the recommendation on the wage developments, 
expressly calling for a „redefinition of the composition of the minimum wage and a review of 
its indexation system‟. In addition, it was recommended to Slovenia to adopt the Act on 
Student Work (point 3). The call for the reform of regulated services in its 2014 version 
included a recommendation for „leaner authorization schemes‟ (point 7). As a new element, the 
Council recommended to Slovenia to complete the privatization of NKBM (the second largest 
bank in the country) in 2014 as planned, and to prepare the Abanka bank for privatization in 
2015 (point 4).
75
  
 
The Recommendation in 2015 was much shorter, visibly a consequence of Slovenia‟s progress 
on a number of issues (see recitals 8 - 15 to the Preamble to the 2015 MIB Council 
Recommendation). The Council recommended, inter alia,  
                                                          
74 2013 MIB Council Recommendation. 
75 2014 MIB Council Recommendation. 
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 the adoption of the Fiscal Rule Act and revision of the Public Finance Act; 
 Advancing the long-term pension system reform and adopting a healthcare and long-
term care reform (point 1); 
 Reviewing the minimum wage mechanism, especially the role of allowances (point 2); 
 Ensuring that the „reforms adopted to improve the efficiency of civil justice help reduce 
the length of proceedings‟ (point 4).76  
 
It should be noted that the recurring themes of the Council recommendations over the three 
years are also the interlinkage with the excessive deficit procedure (the first point in all three 
recommendations); also, the Council consistently recommends reforms in the banking sector, 
counting on the bad bank (Bank Assets Management Company) as a crucial element. 
Additionally, the Council insists on privatization of state assets and recommends that steps be 
taken in making the Slovenian Sovereign Holding operational.  
 
4.2. The role of Council recommendations in the national legal and constitutional 
system 
The question here is not the de facto impact of the recommendations adopted by the Council 
on the decision-making within the national politics.
77
 The central recommendation from the 
excessive deficit procedure, namely to reduce the deficit, has not yet been fully fulfilled 
despite progress in the area. Similary, by analyzing the preambles in the 2014 and 2015 MIB 
Council Recommendations, it is clear that the recommendations were partly followed and in 
part, reforms were not implemented.  
                                                          
76 2015 MIB Council Recommendation. 
77 The concern with regard to autonomous policy making in light of the country specific recommendations within the 
European Semester was raised by the authors of the 2014 FIDE report. M. AHTIK, M. BRKAN and Ţ. NENDL, Slovenia, in U. 
NEERGAARD,  C. JACQUESON and J. H. DANIELSEN (eds.) The Economic and Monetary Union: Constitutional and Institutional 
Aspects of the Economic Governance within the EU, Vol. 1. DJØF Publishing, Copenhagen, p. 529. The issue, however, merits 
further research.  
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The interest of this chapter is to understand in whether from the perspective of the domestic 
legal system, the soft law measures can be considered to have “hardened” – to have acquired 
characteristics that liken it to hard law. Crucial in answering this question is the central crisis 
judgment of the Slovenian Constitutional Court, that was mentioned above: the decision in the 
Bad Bank and Sovereign Holding Act case.
78
 Let us be reminded that in that case, the Court 
widened the spectrum of constitutionally relevant considerations that need to be taken into 
account when the Court, seized with a referendum challenge, decides whether the Constitution 
might be violated should the referendum take place. The Court raised to the status of such a 
constitutionally relevant consideration the credibility of the State in light of the findings made 
within the excessive deficit procedure (Art. 126 TFEU): 
47. Likewise, in conformity with Article 3a of the Constitution, the state must fulfil its 
obligations that arise from the legal order of the European Union. Thereby, it has to be 
taken into consideration that economic policy, even though it does not lie in the 
exclusive competence of the European Union, as does, for example, monetary policy, 
has become a matter of common interest and is conducted in the framework of wider 
guidelines which are adopted by the Council (Article 120 of the TFEU), and that the 
Government and National Assembly must adopt economic decisions in such a manner 
so as to contribute to the goals which the European Union strives to achieve.[24] 
Regarding the obligations under the law of the European Union, the National Assembly 
specifically underlines the recommendations of the Council adopted on the basis of the 
seventh paragraph of Article 126 of the TFEU precisely due to the proceedings against 
the Republic of Slovenia regarding the excessive public deficit. It thereby draws 
attention to the fact that in 2010 and 2011 Slovenia did not reduce this deficit, 
wherefore in this and the next year it has to be reduced by 3% of GDP. […] The 
proceedings regarding the excessive deficit are multi-level proceedings which can lead 
to the introduction of sanctions under the eleventh paragraph of Article 126 of the 
TFEU.[27] Such sanctions substantially exceed the sanctions that otherwise can be 
                                                          
78 See supra Sect. 3.2. 
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imposed on a Member State that does not fulfil obligations under the law of the 
European Union. […] 
48. […] When the Council, in conformity with the eleventh paragraph of Article 126 of 
the TFEU, adopts an order on the introduction of sanctions against the participating 
Member State, as a general rule a fine is imposed, while the Council can decide to 
supplement this fine with other measures under the eleventh paragraph of Article 126 
of the TFEU,[31] including an appeal to the [European Investment Bank] to reconsider 
its lending policy towards the Member State concerned.[32] The National Assembly 
expressly draws attention to the importance of the EIB for the functioning of the 
Slovene banking system, therefore it is possible to agree that the failure to implement 
the urgent measures intended to eliminate the excessive public deficit also jeopardises 
the credibility of the state from the viewpoint of respecting adopted international 
obligations as well as the obligations that Slovenia has as a Member State of the 
European Union, and especially as a Member State whose currency is the euro. The 
credibility of the state influences its capacity to acquire financial resources on the 
financial markets and consequently its capacity to ensure constitutional values, which is 
what the National Assembly draws attention to. […]79 
It would be quite an ungrateful task to try to speculate whether the elevation of the excessive 
deficit procedure recommendations will migrate from the referendum case law into other types 
of procedure before the Court. It would be of particular significance if, for example the Court 
would resolve to use the Recommendations as a factor in weighing the constitutionality of 
legislation, i.e. when applying the proportionality test. In such a hypothetical scenario, the 
legislature would be able to defend, for example, measures for stabilization of public finances, 
e.g. reductions in social transfers, against contestations based on the principle of the social 
(welfare) state (Art. 2 Constitution) or the fundamental right to social security (Art. 50 
Constitution), by invoking the fact that one or the other measure was proposed by the Council.  
                                                          
79 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Decision U-II-1/11, UL 20/2011, paras. 47 and 48. 
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The Bad Bank & Sovereign Holding Act decision was adopted in December 2012, so before 
the issuing of the first MIB Recommendation. The present chapter is not the place for 
speculation whether the MIB recommendation would have been invoked by the National 
Assembly alongside with the excessive deficit recommendations if the case was decided at a 
later point in time. What can be underlined, however, is the fact that for the Eurozone 
countries, the MIB framework also foresees stringent sanctions for non-compliance.
80
 The 
Constitutional Court could have applied the same line of reasoning as it did to the excessive 
deficit Recommendations (paras. 47 and 48 cited supra) to the MIB Recommendations. The 
difference is, however, as has been pointed out in the previous section, that the MIB 
Recommendations are much more detailed and concrete – to the extent that they specify the 
statutes that should be adopted. The hypothetical possibility of, first, recognizing the MIB 
Recommendations as constitutionally relevant considerations, and, second, recognizing this as 
an argument in cases beyond referendum case law would provide the legislative and executive 
branch with nothing short of a crisis constitutionalism missile shield, capable of protecting any 
legislative project from constitutional contestation. 
 
4.3. ‘Implementing’ soft law in national legislation – the Commission’s Banking 
Communication and the Kotnik case 
4.3.1. The Banking Communication in the Slovenian legal system 
The second example of soft law in the Slovenian experience of the European Union‟s quest for 
adequate responses to the crisis differs somewhat from what has so far been discussed. The 
piece of soft law in question is the Commission‟s „Banking Communication‟.81 Its Section 
3.1.2. on „Burden-sharing by the shareholders and the subordinated creditors‟  lays down a 
clear expectation of the Commission that state “aid should only be granted on terms which 
                                                          
80 Regulation (EU) 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area 
81 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in 
favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis („Banking Communication‟), OJ C 216, 30.7.2013, p. 1–15; Constitutional 
Court of Slovenia, Order U-I-295/13/132, UL 82/2014. 
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involve adequate burden-sharing by existing investors” – in order to reduce moral hazard.82 To 
Slovenia and its – still, to a certain extent - predominantly state-owned banking sector battling 
with toxic loans, this was of vast importance.  
The National Assembly, upon proposal of the Government, adopted an amendment to the 
Banking Act introducing the Banking Communication‟s requirement of burden sharing into the 
domestic legislation.
83
 Slovenian media later revealed that the Slovenian Government, prior to 
the adoption of the amendments to the Banking Act, was in (a relatively informal) dialogue 
with the European Commission. The Commission encouraged the Slovenian side to ensure that 
there would be sufficient burden sharing. At the same time, the proposed “haircut” of the 
bondholders was met with skepticism and criticism in Slovenia. Legal opinions, drafted on the 
one hand by Lojze Ude and Matija Damjan of University of Ljubljana Institute of Comparative 
Law and on the other hand by Clifford Chance, commissioned by the Nova Ljubljanska banka 
(the largest bank), warned that the different types of instruments that were later written down 
need to be distinguished with regard to the risk that the buyers of the bonds were knowingly 
exposed to. Nevertheless, the Commission seems to have easily persuaded the Ministry of 
Finance officials. The Act was duly adopted by the National Assembly.
84
 The newly 
introduced provisions of the Banking Act were the legal basis upon which Banka Slovenije (the 
central bank) issued decisions writing down different qualified obligations of five Slovenian 
banks.
85
  
 
4.3.2. The constitutional challenge to the Banking Act 
The aggrieved (“expropriated”) holders of the obligations that have been written down 
(physical and legal persons) as well as the National Council and the Human Rights 
                                                          
82 Para. 40 Banking Communication. There are further 6 points in Section 3.1.2 of the Banking Communication, detailing the 
burden sharing requirement, that were the central focus of the Constitutional Court‟s reference. 
83 Zakon o bančništvu (ZBan-1), UL 99/10 etc., the burden-sharing provisions were added by the ZBan-1L amendments (UL 
96/13). 
84 B. MEKINA, Salonski bojevniki, in Mladina, 12-9-2014, http://www.mladina.si/164091/lazi-in-sprenevedanja-banke-
slovenije/ 
85 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Order U-I-295/13-132, para. 2. 
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Ombudswoman all challenged the relevant provisions of the Banking Act before the Slovenian 
Constitutional Court.
86
  
While the applicants before the Constitutional Court insisted that the Banking Communication 
had no particular significance or character for the Slovenian legislator, the Government and the 
National Assembly justified the amendments to the Banking Act precisely with the 
expectations of the European Commission, as expressed in the Banking Communication. Not 
to respect the Banking Communication, from their perspective, would be a violation both of 
EU state aid law as well as of Art. 3.a of the Slovenian Constitution (the “Europe Clause”), 
regardless of the lack of legal obligation to transpose the Communication into domestic 
legislation.
87
 The claims of the applicants based on the principle of protection of legitimate 
expectations (derived from Art. 2 Constitution) and on the constitutional right to private 
property (Art. 33 Constitution) were refuted by the Government and the National Assembly by 
stating that the alternative to the write-down was the bankruptcy of the banks in question. (Of 
course, this hypothetical scenario presumes that in absence of a write-down, the Commission 
would not have permitted state aid, leading the banks to insolvency).
88
  
The Constitutional Court established that, regardless of the lack of formal binding power of the 
Communication, it is because of the principle of sincere co-operation, that binds all organs of 
the Member States, that all national organs and courts must “respect the Communication in a 
suitable manner”. Albeit formally not binding, the Communication can have legal effects. The 
effect of the Communication is such that the Member State that wishes to aid its banks, in 
order for the aid to be in conformity with the rules of EU law, has to transpose the relevant 
provisions of the Communication in its national legislation and duly apply them in concrete 
                                                          
86 Ibidem. 
87 Ibidem, para. 10. For more on Art. 3.a of the Constitution, see S. BARDUTZKY, The future mandate of the Constitution of 
Slovenia: A potent tradition under strain, in A. ALBI (ed.) The Role and Future of Constitutions in European and Global 
Governance, TMC Asser Press, the Hague, forthcoming in 2016).  
88 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Order U-I-295/13-132, paras. 12 – 13. I am grateful to Meta Ahtik for drawing my 
attention to this “counterfactual” reasoning of the Government and National Assembly. 
  
 
No. 4      2016 
33 
procedures. These effects were taken into account by the Slovenian legislature by adopting the 
contested provisions of the Banking Act.
89
 
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice 
of the European Union and the case is currently pending before the ECJ.
90
 
4.3.3. The reference for a preliminary ruling from the Slovenian Constitutional 
Court 
The reference for a preliminary ruling, in summarized terms, asked the question of the legal 
effects of the Banking Communication; it further questioned the validity of the Banking 
Communication, contesting it from the aspect of different constitutional principles. 
Additionally, it asked the Court of Justice to interpret Directive 2001/24/EC in order to 
establish the relationship between the Banking Communication and the Directive.
91
 
The first question of the Constitutional Court was therefore whether the Banking 
Communication, “taking into account the legal effects that are de facto created” and given the 
exclusive competence of the European Union in state aid law, is to be interpreted as being 
binding for the Member States.  
The Court has also asked for a preliminary ruling as to the validity of the Communication, to 
first determine whether it was within the boundaries of the Commission‟s competences. 
However, even if this should be the case, the Constitutional Court has its concerns with regard 
to the principle of protection of legitimate expectations and the right to private property.  
Regarding the protection of legitimate expectations, the Court considered that the expectations 
of the persons who held instruments of equity and debt issued before the Banking 
Communication was issued could be disrupted. These persons, when they invested their assets, 
                                                          
89 Ibidem, para. 31. 
90 C-526/14 Kotnik and Others, OJ C 81. A hearing was held on 1 December 2015. This was the first request for a preliminary 
ruling from in the history of the Slovenian Constitutional Court. See S. BARDUTZKY, The first preliminary reference to the 
Court of Justice of the EU by the Slovenian Constitutional Court: the case of the Commission’s Banking Communication,16-1-
2015, http://eurocrisislaw.eui.eu/news/the-first-preliminary-reference-to-the-court-of-justice-of-the-eu-by-the-slovenian-
constitutional-court-the-case-of-the-commissions-banking-communication/ 
91 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up 
of credit institutions, OJ L 125. 
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did not know that in the future, state aid to banks would be made conditional upon negative 
changes to the instruments that they held. There was only one legal regime in existence that 
could lead to the deterioration or obliteration of their entitlements at the time when they chose 
to invest in the affected instruments: insolvency proceedings. At the same time, the Court 
recognised that there is an element of public interest in not limiting the temporal scope of the 
Banking Communication. Limiting the temporal scope would increase the strain on public 
finances and harm competition.
92
 
The Court found that undoubtedly the measures in question encroached upon the constitutional 
right to property. It however left the question open whether the encroachment was permissible 
under EU law.
93
 At the same time, the Court expressed doubts as to the proportionality of the 
encroachment. In view of the Court, the contested regime do “not necessarily make it possible 
for the concrete circumstances in the individual Member States which could determine the 
proportionality of the encroachments to be taken into account.”94 The Constitutional Court 
evoked the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on appropriate 
compensation for encroachments upon private property.
95
  
The Court further questioned whether the erasure of the affected entitlements that is based only 
on an evaluation/assessment of the liquidation value of the bank, whereas the actual liquidation 
will never take place, can be considered proportional. The Court is concerned that the affected 
bondholders will carry an excessive burden of the costs of restructuring the bank. This is 
especially the case under the contested regime of ZBan-1, as not all categories of bondholders 
participated in the losses. Depositors and senior bondholders only benefited from the state aid 
that was subsequently given to the bank in question. However, at the same time the 
Constitutional Court recognised that the Banking Communication was from the beginning 
                                                          
92 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Order U-I-295/13-132, para. 44. 
93 Ibidem, para. 48.  
94 Ibidem, para. 49. 
95 Ibidem, para. 50. 
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intended to affect to a larger extent the bondholders whose position was more exposed to 
risk.
96
   
4.3.4. Kotnik: The sketch of a preliminary analysis 
The primary focus in the Kotnik case for the present chapter is not so much the appropriateness 
or even the constitutionality of the different possible strategies of assisting banks in financial 
difficulties. The interest is much more in the role that was played by EU crisis soft law. Even 
here, it is difficult to draw any final conclusions given that the case is still pending before the 
Court of Justice and the Slovenian Constitutional Court is awaiting input from Luxembourg 
regarding the legal effects and potential binding nature of the contested Communication. But 
some observations can be made on the events and proceedings that took place so far. 
First, the Slovenian executive and legislative seem to have omitted to a large extent political 
decision making regarding the question of the multiple possible strategies of saving the banks 
in the presence of what seemed a clear and unequivocal signal from the Commission. This of 
course also means that the legislation was adopted without much consideration given to the 
country‟s Constitution: if Slovenian media is right, all such concerns were swiped aside97.  
The “implementation” of the soft law measure in the Banking Act may strike an observer as an 
act of unnecessary servility to the instructions from Brussels. A mere Commission 
communication became a zakon? However, it has to be recognized that thereby, the 
controversial solutions for the problems of the banks were given a classic legal basis. This was, 
of course, on the one hand, a particular case of “hardening” of soft law as it provided a legal 
foundation for the actions of the Bank of Slovenia. At the same time, in the circumstances of a 
                                                          
96 Ibidem, para. 50 – 51.  
97 An issue worth noting is also that even within the Banking Communication, and similarly in the Banking Act, there was a 
wider margin of appreciation for the national authorities. The new Art. 261.a ZBan-1 envisages that the Banka Slovenije can as 
an extraordinary measure order not only a full, but also a partial write-down as well as conversion of qualified debt. The 
communication between Commission officials and the Slovenian Ministry of Finance revealed in the Slovenian media, 
however, seems to suggest that the Commission officials, in e-mails, insisted that the only way to go was full write-down. (see 
B. MEKINA, Salonski bojevniki; I am grateful to Matija Damjan for his comments on this issue). In that sense, one might 
wonder whether there was not sufficient room for the application of the principle of proportionality (a concern raised by the 
Constitutional Court) within the boundaries of the text of the Banking Communication (especially para. 43 of the Banking 
Communication that connects the choice of the different strategy to assist the bank to the adequacy of its capital ratio; see also 
para. 10 of the Constitutional Court Order). This would have shed a different light on the involvement of the Constitutional 
Court and of the Court of Justice in the matter. 
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constitutional democracy, it made it possible for the solutions, foreseen in EU soft law, to be 
contested in their “new form”, as domestic legislation. In a way, this contributed to the fact that 
in the end, the responsibility for the political decision making “enacted” in the form of the 
Banking Communication, will be ascribed to the organ that adopted the decision: the 
Commission.  
It is worth noting that the Slovenian Constitutional Court decided to engage in judicial 
dialogue with the Court of Justice. Of course, one might speculate that for the Constitutional 
Court, a more straightforward way of dealing with the constitutional challenge would be to 
reject the arguments of the Government and the National Assembly where they claimed that 
they had no choice but to “transpose” the Communication. This might have taught the 
executive and the legislative branch not to rely on Commission soft law to function as a trump 
card in the domestic procedures of constitutional review in the future but instead to demand 
“hard currency” from the Commission whenever the latter attempts to push true a particular 
politically sensitive decision.  
It is also possible that the temptation of the Slovenian Constitutional Court to share some of 
the responsibility for the final outcome of the case with the Court of Justice was too hard to 
resist. If the Constitutional Court‟s suspicions are confirmed and the writing down of the debt 
violates constitutional rights, the State could be liable for massive damages; a difficult burden 
for a Constitutional Court to shoulder. 
But from another angle, the Court‟s decision to engage in judicial dialogue can also be 
understood as an attempt to “play its part” in the effort of the courts in Europe to restore some 
of the rule of law that has eroded with the responses to the crisis. Seeking a definitive answer 
on the compatibility of the burden sharing measures with EU law and constitutional principles 
from the Court of Justice will lead to the formulation of a Europe-wide standard for the present 
and future cases.  
5. Conclusion 
In comparison to the majority of comparative chapters in this volume, Slovenia has undergone 
a specific “crisis experience”: it probably came closer than no other Eurozone member to the 
situation where it would have to ask for financial assistance yet avoided this last step over the 
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edge of the abyss. As a result, the changes in the legal and institutional structures that can be 
observed in Slovenia are much less drastic than in the countries that had accepted financial 
assistance. Slovenia did not face the challenge of having to position memoranda of 
understanding within its constitutional system, for example.  
Nevertheless, the country‟s tiptoeing at the edge of the cliff did nevertheless leave its marks in 
the legal and institutional system. The adoption of measures directed at preventing the situation 
where a request for financial assistance would be inevitable demanded compromises, as is 
perhaps best shown in the transformations experienced in the area of referendum law. But even 
earlier developments, as is shown in the sections discussing the ratification of the EFSF and 
the adoption of the fiscal rule, did not pass by without changing the settled understanding of 
constitutional categories.  
The last section of this chapter, discussing the role of soft law, is the part of this text written in 
the most speculative style. This is due to two circumstances: first, the mention of EU soft law 
(excessive deficit recommendations) in a judgment of the Slovenian Constitutional Court, 
elevating them to no less than “constitutionally relevant considerations” is unusual to the 
extent that one may wonder how it could have effect beyond that particular case. But it might, 
and if it does, the attempt in the present chapter to depict the level of detail that the 
recommendations (especially MIB!) have reached so far, should be considered a timely 
warning. If the MIB recommendations, too, are recognized as constitutionally relevant 
consideration, the EU‟s attempts at economic policy co-ordination, as informal as they may 
seem at first sight, may have found a warm and welcoming environment in Slovenian 
constitutional law.  
The second circumstance that commands the last section of the chapter to be written in 
speculative tones is the pending Kotnik case before the Court of Justice. Potential of the 
European constitutional courts to exercise review over crisis soft law will be better assessed 
after the decision of the Court of Justice. The latter, as well as the subsequent final decision of 
the Slovenian Constitutional Court in the first case where it reached out to Luxembourg, will 
be key for revisiting some of the questions of contemporary Slovenian constitutionalism.   
